SECURITIES, REGULATION: LIABILITY FOR ALLEGEDLY
FALSE REGISTRATION STATEMENT LIMITED TO THE
PARTICULAR SECURITIES ISSUED UNDER THE
STATEMENT
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp." has now firmly established that under section 11 of the Securities Act of 19332 a purchaser of securities may not successfully sue on the basis of misstatements in a registration statement when the securities which he purchased, while of the same class, were not those, which were the direct
subject of the registration statement. In the instant case, Brunswick
Corporation, pursuant to a registration statement and prospectus
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, issued a series
of convertible subordinated debentures. After the effective date of
the registration statement, the plaintiff purchased a quantity of the
common stock of the corporation on the open market, none of which,
however, had been issued upon the conversion of the debentures.
The purchaser maintained that it had suffered a substantial loss as
the result of a subsequent decrease in the market value of the stock
and therefore asserted a right to relief based upon, inter alia, section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Plaintiff's contention was that the
registration statement and prospectus contained untrue statements
of material facts and omitted material facts concerning the longterm financing of the corporation. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the section 11 count of the complaint, and the
motion was granted by the court.3
The Securities Act of 19334 and the Securities Exchange Act of
i9345 sought to prevent fraud and deceit in the purchase and sale of
securities by compelling disclosure of all material facts concerning
the transaction. 6 Accordingly, section 11 of the Securities Act creates
1257 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
'48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
'257 F. Supp. at 884.
'Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964).
'See Columbia Gen. Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 265 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1959). See generally Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. Rev. 1340 (1966); Douglas
& Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); Hanna, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CAuF. L. RaV. 1 (1934); Symposium-Three Years
of the Securities Act, 4 LAw & CONTEMIP. PROB. 1 (1937).
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civil liability if any part of a registration statement contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits any material fact required
to be stated to render the information therein not misleading. 7 The
primary innovation provided by the section was the extension of the
permissible class of defendants to include the issuer, directors of the
issuer, accountants and similar experts, and the underwriters, thereby
destroying the common law requirement that there be privity of
contract between the plaintiff and defendant. 8 Another significant
departure from the common law was the provision for reasonable
belief in the truth of the statements as an affirmative defense available
to those other than the issuer, thus eliminating the element of
scienter required in an action for deceit. 9 The motivation apparently supporting these two variations is the policy that the burden of
proof should be placed on the defendant as to those facts peculiarly
within his own knowledge. 10 Consistent with this notion, the original version of section 11" did not require any showing of causation
or reliance by the plaintiff. The Exchange Act, however, amended
the section to require that reliance upon the registration statement
be established when the issuer had made an earnings statement generally available covering a period of at least twelve months beginning
after the effective date of the registration statement. 2 In addition,
the amendment permitted damages to be reduced to the extent that
the defendant could show that the misstatements or omissions in the
prospectus or registration statement did not contribute to the plaintiff's loss.' 3

The relief afforded by section 11 results, however, only when the
plaintiff is able to establish that he is within the class of persons
7 See 3 Loss, SECIUTMS REGULATION 1721 (2d ed. 1961); Shulman, Civil Liability
and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 247 (1933); Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 71, 72 (1962); Legislation, 48
HAav. L. REv. 107, 111 (1934); Comment, 38 WASH. L. REv. 627, 628 (1962); Annot.,
37 A.L.R.2d 649, 653 (1954).
a Compare Securities Act of 1933, § 11 (a), 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (a)
(1964), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441,
448 (1931).
0 Compare Securities Act of 1933, § 11 (b) (3), 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k (b) (3) (1964), with Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 340 (1889).
10 Simpson, supra note 7, at 71.
a' Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 48 Stat. 82.
12 Securities Act of 1933, § 11 (a), as amended by Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 206 (a), 48 Stat. 907, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (a) (1964).
13 Securities Act of 1933, § 11 (e), as amended by Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 206 (e), 48 Stat. 907, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (e) (1964).
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which the section seeks to protect. Thus, as to those who may invoke
the statute, section 11 (a) provides that
In any case any part of the registration statement.., contained an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact ... necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
any person acquiringsuch security ... may ... sue .... 14
Prior to the instant case, the class of permissible plaintiffs established
by the words "any person acquiring such security" had never been
definitively delineated. The question thus arises whether the words
should be construed to extend the privilege to sue only to the purchasers of-the registered securities or whether persons who purchase
securities of the identical class as those registered should also have
a cause of action. A still broader interpretation, one which apparently has never been considered by the courts, would extend protection
to the purchasers of any securities issued by the firm that filed the
registration statement. The few cases that have considered the problem of possible plaintiffs have adopted the most narrow construction
of the section 5 although no case has squarely faced the issue. For
example, the court in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.10 stated,
without any effort to substantiate its determination, that a suit under
section 11 may be maintained only by those who purchase securities
that are the direct subject of the registration statement.17 The precedential value of the case is limited, however, because the owners of
the securities not issued under the registration statement abandoned
their section 11 claim in the district court.' 8 Likewise, the court in
Barnes v. Osofsky'9 adhered to the same limited construction, but it
did not definitively settle the question since the case involved the
approval of a settlement rather than the determination 'of a litigated
controversy. 20 The commentators also seem to adhere to a similar
position although few of them directly treat the issue of proper plain1 Securities Act of 1933, § I1 (a), 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (a) (1964).
(Emphasis added.)
15 See, e.g., Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Rudnick v.
Franchard Corp., 237 F. Supp. 871, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Montague v. Electronic Corp.
of America, 76 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
' 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), 38 VA. L. REv. 232 (1952).
1 188 F.2d at 786.
Is Ibid.
Is 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
20 Id. at 726.
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tiffs under section 11. 21 Furthermore, strict interpretation is sug22
gested by the legislative history of the act.
Notwithstanding this seemingly unanimous construction of the
section, the purchaser in Colonial Realty argued that the misleading
registration statement affected the market value of all the outstanding shares of common stock of the company, not merely those issued
under the registration statement, and consequently that all purchasers of this class of stock should have a remedy under section 11.23
The plaintiff also stressed that by adopting a limited statutory construction the court would be allowing blind chance to determine the
applicability of section 11 since the open market purchaser had no
way of ascertaining whether the shares he would receive would be
those covered by the registration statement. 24 The court, seemingly
in sympathy with the plaintiff, acknowledged the economic soundness of these arguments; however, when it surveyed the general pattern of the legislation, the relevant case law, the views of the commentators, and the legislative history of the statute, it concluded
that each of these considerations prompted the determination that
the availability of the remedies under section 11 was restricted to
purchasers of the securities issued under the registration statement in
question.25 Consequently, it noted that the plaintiff's arguments
only served to illuminate the shortcomings of the statute, a problem
which it felt should be corrected by the legislative process. However,
in an effort to palliate the result reached, the court observed that the
purchaser probably had a remedy under other sections of the act.26
The court's decision was evidently dictated by the language of the
statute, which seems very clearly to limit the remedies of the section
to purchasers of the securities issued under the registration statement. Nonetheless, the plaintiff's position was not untenable. Assuming that the legislative objectives were to prevent the practice
of fraud in the purchase and sale of securities and, as an appropriate
21

See, e.g., 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1731 n.160; Simpson, supra note 7, at 72;
Legislation, 48 HARv. L. Rav. 107, 110 (1934); Comment, 38 WASH. L. REv. 627, 628

(1963).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933). But see id. at 21-22; S. REP.
No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1933).
23 257 F. Supp. at 880-81; Brief for Plaintiff, p. 34.
214257 F. Supp. at 881; Brief for Plaintiff, p. 21.
25 257 F. Supp. at 880, 884.
2
6Id. at 881.
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means to the end, to compensate investors -for losses incurred 2 7 a
construction of section 11 which would make the spectre of liability
more ominous would be more likely to yield the desired prohibitory
effect. Furthermore, to the extent that the information contained
in the prospectus affected the price at which the plaintiff purchased
his stock, he seemingly should have a remedy if that information
proves to be false and a consequent readjustment in price takes place.
Of course, a possible result of this position is that the liability imposed would be ruinous; however, the probability of such a consequence is minimal since the act provides a number of positive restraints on the limits of liability, such as the abbreviated statute of
limitations which restricts the time within which an action may be
brought to one year after discovery of the untrue statement or to a
reasonable time for discovery not to exceed three years from the
date of the offer to the public. 28

Thus the plaintiff's arguments

accord with the objectives sought to be realized by the statute.
Nevertheless, the terms of section 11 appear to present an insuperable
barrier to recovery. The language could have been strained to have
allowed the plaintiff to prevail and thus to reach what is perhaps the
more desirable result. Such a construction, however, would be so
evidently tortured that few, if any, courts would be likely to follow
such a precedent. Thus it appears that any result different from that
reached in ColonialRealty must be accomplished by statutory amendment rather than judicial reformation.
27
28

See authorities cited note 6 supra; Shulman, supra note 7, at 227.
Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964).

